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The Scholar as Advocate
Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Academic freedom in this country has been so closely identified with
faculty autonomy that the two terms are often used interchangeably, especially
by faculty members who are resisting restraints on their freedom to do as they
please. While there may be some dispute as to whether or how far academic
freedom protects the autonomy of universities or of students, the autonomy of
faculty members seems to lie close to the core of the traditional American
conception of academic freedom. As elaborated by the American Association
of University Professors, this conception of academic freedom calls for protecting individual faculty members from lay interference, especially from the
university trustees and administrators on whom they depend for their livelihood, so that faculty may perform their social function of generating and
disseminating new knowledge "without fear or favor."' Otherwise, according
to this view, the public could not be certain that the opinions presented by
faculty were the candid views of academic experts, undistorted by the less
informed views of their lay benefactors.
I have previously argued that faculty autonomy fails to protect the academic
values underlying this traditional conception of academic freedom when
faculty members need to find external sponsors for their work.2 Faculty who
are eager for funding may face powerful incentives to accommodate the
interests of sponsors who seek to control the agenda of academic research and
the dissemination of its results. In this context deference to faculty autonomy
in the name of academic freedom could tie the, hands of universities and
prevent them from responding effectively to certain contemporary threats to
academic values.
Although law professors rarely rely on external research sponsors, many
face as powerful a threat to their academic integrity from a different sort of
benefactor-the consulting client. Unlike many academics, law professors are
trained for lucrative careers outside the academy. Those who teach and write
in fields of interest to the practicing bar can sell their technical expertise to
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1.

American Association of University Professors, General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure (1915), reprintedin Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1990, at 393, 396 [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].

2.

Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1363
(1988).
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lawyers and clients, and the cachet of their academic positions enhances the
demand for their services.3 These consulting opportunities may be attractive
professionally as well as financially. Consulting offers hands-on exposure to
new legal problems that may not find their way into appellate opinions, and
thereby come to the attention of law professors in the course of their academic reading, for years, if ever. Even familiar legal issues may take on new
meaning for professors when they see them in complex, real-world contexts
instead of thinking about them in the abstract. Legal academics may also be
attracted by the opportunity to be effective in the real world, or to influence
the development of the law, or to advance the legal interests of people or
organizations that matter to them. Consulting may seem like a significant part
of their professional lives that enhances their performance as teachers and
scholars, and to the extent that law professors see academic freedom issues
arising in their consulting activities, their first impulse might be to argue that
academic freedom should protect their right to consult.
An argument that academic freedom protects the right of faculty members
to consult outside the academy would find qualified support in AAUP policy
statements. The AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure4 calls for protecting faculty members from institutional censorship or discipline not only in their teaching and scholarship but also when
they speak or write as citizens, so long as they are "accurate," "exercise
appropriate restraint," "show respect for the opinions of others," and make
clear that they are not "institutional spokesm[e]n."5 This list of qualifiers
suggests greater concern that the extramural activities of faculty could sully
the public image of the academy than that they might interfere with the
performance of academic duties. The latter concern is more salient in a 1968
Statement on Professional Ethics, 6 which provides that the individual profes-

sor "determines the amount and character of the work he does outside his
institution with due regard to his paramount responsibilities within it."7 Although this statement acknowledges that work outside the university may have
an impact on performance within the university, the primary concern
seems to be that outside activities will consume too much time. Many uni
versities address this problem by limiting the amount of time that faculty
may devote to work outside the university, as more recent AAUP reports
have acknowledged.'
A potentially more serious and intractable problem than the effect of
consulting on the time commitments of faculty is its effect on their intellectual

3.

See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 Yale L.J. 1131 (1981).

4.

The text of this statement is reprinted in Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1990, at 407
[hereinafter 1940 Statement].

5.

Id. at 408.

6.

The text of this statement is set forth in 55 AAUP Bull. 86 (1969).

7.

Id. at 87.

8.

See, e.g., Academic Freedom and Tenure: Corporate Funding of Academic Research, Academe, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 18a, 20a, 22a.
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commitments. This threat is particularly grave for law faculty, whose consulting activities often cast them in the role of advocates for the interests of clients.
The role of advocate calls for constructing persuasive arguments that will
generate favorable outcomes for clients. This is very different from the function they perform as scholars-the function that justifies their academic
freedom-of saying what they think "without fear or favor." There are reasons
to question whether the academic views of legal scholars who do significant
consulting are truly their own views, undistorted by the interests of their
clients. And if consulting activities distort the views that law faculty espouse as
scholars, then academic freedom is failing to perform its essential function.
At the basest level, we might suspect that financial self-interest distorts the
views expressed by law professors who consult, just as the AAUP fears that it
would distort the views expressed by untenured faculty who could be fired for
making statements contrary to the interests of university benefactors. Although law faculty are generally better compensated than other academics
and need not fear a devastating loss of livelihood if they alienate their consulting clients, consulting income can easily outpace even a rather generous
academic salary and can provide a significant incentive to keep those clients
happy. Consider, for example, a law professor who earns a comfortable
academic salary of $100,000 per year and scrupulously complies with university requirements to restrict consulting activities to one eight-hour day per
week. At an hourly consulting rate of $250, her annual consulting income
would equal her academic salary. She might well be reluctant to take a
scholarly stand on an issue that could contradict a client's position, and she
might remain silent rather than saying what she thinks. Worse yet, she might
be encouraged to take a scholarly stand that serves her clients' interests, either
because she is explicitly paid to write an article9 or because she expects her
published views to attract consulting business from clients who find her views
congenial.
There are limits to this strategy, even for those shameless enough to follow
it consciously. Law professors may tarnish their reputations as scholars, and
perhaps even diminish their future effectiveness as advocates, if they publish
patently foolish or disingenuous views. But good lawyers can make sensible
arguments for a wide range of views, and it is often impossible to identify a
disingenuous argument in the hands of a good advocate, or an unsound
argument advanced by a leading expert in her field.
A more subtle distortion might arise from the tendency of good advocates
to believe their own arguments. In other words, rather than taking positions
that they don't agree with, law professors may find themselves agreeing with
positions that they would not otherwise have taken. Most litigators have seen
their own views on legal questions transformed by the experience of advocacy.
If they have previously taken an inconsistent position on the same issue, they
may see this transformation occurring on a conscious level. More typically,

9.

See William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 227, 230-32
(1965).
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they will not yet have worked out their views on the precise issue presented,
and may even be able to persuade themselves that had they thought about the
issue hard enough beforehand they would have had to come to the same
conclusion regardless of their clients' interests. But if they are candid and
introspective, they may have to concede the impossibility of untangling their
own views from their clients' interests.
Anthropologist Lawrence Rosen, who is also trained as a lawyer, describes
this process of viewpoint transformation as he recalls an experience he had as
a second-year law student preparing an attorney to cross-examine an anthropologist expert witness at trial:
As I prepared our attorney for his appearance in the case, my sense of
indignation and my resolve in the wisdom of our own arguments grew. Yet at
some point along the way I found myself asking how I, who had no field

experience in the area, could be so sure that our own interpretations were
correct.... As an anthropologist, I was less certain that I was right about many
of the arguments I was, as a lawyer-to-be, encouraging our counsel to make.'
Rosen's perspective is particularly illuminating because his academic background in anthropology provides him with methodological commitments that
allow him to distinguish the role of anthropologist-expert from the role of
lawyer-advocate. Recognizing that he has no field experience in the area of
the expert's testimony, he attributes his growing conviction in the wisdom of
the position he is advancing to his role as advocate or lawyer-to-be rather than
to his expertise as a trained anthropologist.
Even without legal training, academics in other fields who serve as expert
witnesses at trial may find themselves feeling and behaving like advocates.
They may be urged to take positions that are more emphatic and less qualified
than they would be comfortable asserting in a purely academic context, and
may subject themselves to professional criticism for complying."
The tension between the role of advocate and the role of scholar may be
less apparent to legal scholars, who are trained as advocates and who often
take something like an advocate's stance in their scholarly writing. 12 They may
therefore be less alert to the distorting effects of extramural advocacy on their
academic writing. Taken in by their own advocacy, they may embrace as

10. The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 Am. Anthropologist 555, 566 (1977).
11. Id.;see also Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing:
Historians and the Sears Case, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1629 (1988); cf.J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert
Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship and Expert Witnessing, Pub.
Historian, Winter 1984, at 5, 19 (concluding that "the process by which a fundamentally
honest expert witness arrives at conclusions.., differs less from that which honest scholars
employ in their everyday work than is sometimes charged").
12. See generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 Va. L. Rev.
1545 (1990) (arguing that both lawyers and legal scholars adopt a voice that is objective,
neutral, impersonal, authoritative, judgmental, and certain as a rhetorical device to be
persuasive); cf. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich.
L. Rev. 1835, 1847-50, 1881 (1988) (characterizing legal scholarship as a normative enterprise of addressing prescriptions to public decision-makers rather than an allegedly objective
practice of describing truth).
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scholars views they developed as advocates without consciously recalling that
their viewpoints were initially dictated by the interests of their clients.
Ironically, it may be the most unabashedly biased scholars, rather than the
most careful and fair-minded, who are the least vulnerable to this process of
distortion. Committed scholars with a distinct political outlook who consult
exclusively for interests that they have been advancing all along in their
scholarship may feel that their viewpoints are not altered by serving as advocates for those interests. Indeed, they may have previously articulated their
commitments on the issues they address as advocates in their published
scholarship, allaying concerns that their views were developed while serving
particular clients. Politically engaged scholars could also argue that their
representation of clients is unlikely to mislead anyone as to the character of
their scholarly writing because they make no pretense of objectivity. They may
also be working pro bono and therefore have no personal financial stake in
tailoring their scholarship to sit their clients' interests. Such persons may be
motivated to consult for political reasons and may feel particularly strongly
that academic freedom should protect their right to participate as advocates
in the legal system.
But even politically engaged scholars run the risk of distorting or overstating their academic views when they serve as advocates for clients. Commitment to a political movement or set of normative values is rarely unambiguously congruent with an individual client's interests, and effective advocacy
may dictate certain choices among plausible competing viewpoints or overrule a scholarly sense of nuance.
Here again, the experience of nonlawyer expert witnesses in litigation is
illuminating. Much has been written about the role of feminist historians as
experts in the case of EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.13 The EEOC charged Sears
with employment discrimination primarily on the basis of statistical evidence
indicating that most of its higher-paid commission sales jobs were filled by
men, while most of its lower-paid noncommission sales jobs were held by
women. The EEOC claimed that the gender disparities were the result of
discrimination, and Sears countered that they reflected gender-based differences in job preferences and qualifications. Each side called upon feminist
scholars in the field of women's history to buttress its inferences from the
statistical record. Professor Rosalind Rosenberg provoked considerable controversy among feminist historians by testifying on behalf of Sears that women
prefer selling apparel, housewares, and accessories to selling fencing, refrigeration equipment, and tires; that women tend to be more interested in the
social and cooperative aspects of the workplace and less interested in competition; and that women prefer noncommission sales to commission sales because they can enter and leave the job more easily and because it entails more
social contact and less stress. 14 Professor Alice Kessler-Harris testified on

13. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). For an account of the
controversy and its academic freedom implications, see Haskell & Levinson, supra note 11.

14. 628 F. Supp. at 1308.
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behalf of the EEOC that statistical differences between men and women
within jobs in the workforce can be explained only by sex discrimination on
the part of employers."5
After the trial, Kessler-Harris conceded that her testimony was affected by
her role in the adversary system, noting that in her rebuttal to Rosenberg's
argument "subtlety and nuance were omitted, and . .. evidence was marshalled to make a point while complexities and exceptions vanished from
sight." 6 Advocacy in the legal system calls for commitment to a client's
interests, and only by rare coincidence will those interests line up perfectly
with a carefully considered, fully articulated scholarly position, even if that
position has a distinct political outlook behind it.
The case of the politically engaged scholar raises the question whether
concerns about the distorting effects of consulting rest on unrealistic assumptions about "objectivity" and "truth" in academic writing in general or in legal
scholarship in particular. Indeed, it might seem to call into question the
broader argument for academic freedom. If the justification for academic
freedom is to preserve a neutral enclave in which disinterested scholars will
seek out the truth, then why grant academic freedom to a scholar who is
committed to a particular political agenda? On the other hand, if we concede
the academic freedom of the politically engaged scholar, then why worry
about the scholar who may be biased toward the interests of consulting
clients? What remains of the traditional justification for academic freedom
once we concede that values, preferences, and biases inevitably pervade all
scholarship?
While a full response to these challenges is beyond the scope of these
remarks, a few points are in order. First, it is not clear that our traditional
justification for academic freedom necessarily requires acceptance of a now
discredited conception of scholarly objectivity. Postmodernist critics might
find the AAUP's 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom, in
contrast to the more recent AAUP statements that have followed it, to be a
remarkably forward-looking document in this respect. Its authors avoid claiming objectivity or neutrality on behalf of scholars, instead describing an academy in which different "experts" will hold and espouse divergent viewpoints.
They call for protecting scholars from lay intrusion in their work, not so that
they will feel free to speak The Truth, but so that they may state candidly their
own views, such as they are, undistorted by the views of their benefactors. The
hallmarks of the scholar's role in this conception are genuineness of viewpoint and freedom from the partiality born of financial dependence, not
17
objectivity in any angelic sense.
15. Id. at 1314 n.63.
16. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and Company: A Personal
Account, 35 Radical Hist. Rev. 57, 74 (1986).
17. See 1915 Declaration, supra note 1. Some more recent articulations appear to make stronger
claims for scholarship, at least in an idealized form, as involving the objective pursuit and
expression of truth. For example, the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenurejustifies academic freedom as a means of promoting the common good
through "the free search for truth and its free exposition." 1940 Statement, supra note 4, at
407. Writing in 1981, Anthony Kronman articulated the difference between scholarship and

The Scholaras Advocate
Second, even ifwe concede the impossibility of objectivity in scholarship, it
does not follow that we should ignore bias in scholarship, nor that if we put up
with some types of bias we must tolerate them all. Consider another familiar
arena in which neutrality is no more possible than it is in scholarship, and yet
it is at least as powerful as an ideal: a court of law. We recognize thatjudges are
human beings with values and preferences and political outlooks that influence their views on legal questions. Yet our sense ofjustice is offended when a
judge decides a case in which she has a direct financial stake, or in which her
brother is a party. Sometimes the parties to a lawsuit might be willing to waive
a trivial conflict of interest, such as a minor stockholding in a company with a
small interest in the litigation, but they would certainly want to know about it
and have the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they nonetheless
trust the judge to resolve their dispute fairly."' And if the judge were to accept
a surreptitious payment from a party in exchange for a favorable resolution of
a pending matter, it would be no answer to a charge of impropriety to say that
there is no such thing as an impartial tribunal because all judges are human
beings with inevitable biases.
Obviously there are important differences between judges and scholars,
and the social function ofjudges calls for a type of fairness that we may not
demand of scholars. Legal scholars are not responsible for actually deciding
cases, although some purport to tell judges how to do so. Legal arguments,
whether set forth in ajudicial opinion or in a law review article or in a brief,
inevitably proceed from value choices. But there is a difference between an
analysis that proceeds from value choices and an analysis that proceeds from
client interests. An advocate admittedly speaks on behalf of a client, while a
legal scholar usually purports to speak for herself, whatever her underlying
values may be. At the very least, ifa legal scholar's views are in fact the product
of a client's interests, her audience will want to know that. Otherwise, they
might place undue credence in the views she publishes in the mistaken belief
that they are her own. 19
advocacy in terms of the role of truth: "[W] hereas [advocacy] is indifferent to truth in that it
does not regard the discovery of truth as something valuable for its own sake, [scholarship]
has the apprehension and expression of the truth as its internal, constitutive goal." Foreword:
Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 Yale LJ. 955, 968 (1981).
18. The current federaljudicia-disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988), prohibits waiver
in these circumstances. An earlier version of that statute required recusal only when the
judge had a "substantial interest." See John P. Frank, Clement Haynsworth, the Senate, and
the Supreme Court 41-42, 131-33 (Charlottesville, 1991); Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and
Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of FederalJudges, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
662, 677-80, 698-705 (1985).
19. Some scholars define their role differently, not claiming to present their own views, but
instead offering provocative ideas that they may or may not personally agree with, or
demonstrating that counterintuitive conclusions follow from seemingly unexceptionable
starting premises, whether or not they personally accept the premises or the conclusions. So
long as it is clear that this is what they are doing, readers will know to read skeptically and will
not be misled into believing that the author endorses the ideas presented. But this is a
difficult line for scholars to draw when they speak out on policy issues of concern to the
general public, as the controversies surrounding the nomination of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court, and more recently the nomination of Lani Guinier to head the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division, have demonstrated. Policy makers and the public may
feel angry and skeptical when scholars seek to distinguish their personal beliefs from the
apparent policy implications of their previously published work.
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But even if no one is misled, readers are deprived of the sort of analysis that
scholars are peculiarly able to provide when the analysis that an academic
presents to them is conditioned by her clients' interests. The role of scholar
permits the formulation of a coherent approach to a field, even though that
approach is inevitably dominated by a set of underlying values. The role of
advocate, by contrast, places a premium on expediency, often at the expense
of coherence in any broad sense. Clients are generally more interested in
winning a favorable outcome than in furthering any particular set of values in
a coherent fashion. When scholars speak for themselves, they can and should
be candid about the value choices underlying their analysis. But a client's
interests may be better served by obfuscating underlying values than by elucidating them. However biased scholars may be, their work will be more useful
to their audience if they speak 'candidly rather than strategically.
Third, some forms of legal scholarship make stronger implicit claims of
objectivity than others, and thus present greater risks of deception when the
authors' views are influenced by undisclosed client interests. When legal
scholarship takes the form of unabashedly normative argument about what
the law should be, readers will be alert to the value-dependence of the
judgments set forth, whether they believe that the underlying values are those
of the author or those of the author's client. But much legal scholarship
consists of purportedly neutral, accurate description of what current law
provides. Treatises in particular generally claim to provide such descriptions,
and standard law review articles typically include substantial sections that
purport to offer a neutral description of current doctrine. Treatise writers are
particularly likely to be in demand as consultants, in part because their
statements of legal doctrine are likely to be accepted as neutral and authoritative. There is thus a heightened risk of deception when treatise writers make
descriptive statements about legal issues on which they have formed views
while serving as consultants for clients. Moreover, whereas there may be a
multitude of scholarly voices advancing competing normative arguments about
particular controversial issues, in most fields there are few treatises.
If an analysis that is distorted by the interests of clients is inferior to an
analysis that is not so distorted, perhaps there are mechanisms in place to
correct t e problem. Readers may recognize the distortions present in the
writings of scholar-advocates, or perhaps other scholars will point out any
flaws in the analysis. But legal scholars, particularly treatise writers, often write
for readers who are less expert than they are, such as judges in courts of
general jurisdiction who are not experts in any particular field and who may
rely on the expertise and authority of leading scholars. Moreover, in spite of
the vast numbers of pages written by legal scholars each year, present-day
scholars do not typically revisit problems that have been addressed by other
scholars in the past, apart from particularly controversial and enduring issues.
When scholars write about issues that are important to parties with competing
interests, other advocates, and perhaps other scholar-advocates, may be motivated to counter any prescriptive suggestions they make that would have
untoward consequences for their clients. On the other hand, some parties
with opposing interests on an issue may not have the resources to hire their
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own scholars to develop and publish competing views, in which case the
published views of a scholar-advocate retained by the party, with greater
resources may be the only scholarly view on the issue in the literature.
If consulting leads law professors to take expedient positions on legal issues
and prevents them from developing coherent visions of their fields, they may
lose the respect of some of their academic colleagues, and this may be
reflected in their salaries. But once they have tenure, there is not much else
that they stand to lose. And, as suggested above, consulting income could
loom large in comparison to even a generous academic salary. Another
mechanism that many universities use to limit the impact of consulting on the
performance of academic duties is to restrict the amount of time that faculty
may devote to outside work, typically to something like one day a week. If
enforced, such restrictions may protect faculty from excessive time commitments outside the university, but they are unlikely to insulate law faculty from
substantial financial incentives to keep their clients' interests firmly in mind.
Even where consulting income is small relative to academic salary, faculty may
be more responsive to the demands of clients who can fire them at will than to
the broader interests of an academy that is bound to continue paying their
salaries for life and is largely disabled by the institution of academic freedom
from controlling them.
If financial self-interest were the only problem, disgorgement of consulting
revenues might be a possible solution. Medical schools often require faculty to
turn over or share the income that they earn through clinical practice. A
similar system in law schools might reduce individual incentives to consult, but
could present a corresponding danger that financially pressed law schools or
universities would develop an interest in promoting faculty consulting so that
they could share in the proceeds. Indeed, law schools in major cities with high
costs of living may already have an interest in promoting or at least tolerating
consulting by faculty to alleviate pressures for salary increases.
I do not believe that financial incentives are the only problem. The process
of advocacy can distort the views of scholars even if they are working on a pro
bono basis, although this may be less likely to occur than in the case of paid
consulting, partly because of the absence of financial incentives and partly
because typically advocates choose to advance in their pro bono work views to
which they are already committed.
A more modest palliative that addresses the potential for deception when
advocates speak as scholars is to strengthen academic norms concerning
disclosure of consulting interests. Perhaps legal scholars should disclose prominently any clients whose interests might lurk behind their views whenever they
publish books and articles that discuss issues they have been paid to think
about, and notjust when they publish works that they were specifically paid to
produce. Such disclosure might include the identity of the client, a brief
description of the relevant matter, and the role that the scholar played in it.
Some scholars will feel quite uncomfortable doing this, in part because it is
such an uncommon practice and disclosure of information that is not commonly disclosed may be experienced as a loss of privacy. Scholars who believe
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that they can distinguish their own views from the views they advance on
behalf of clients might also feel that such disclosures will undermine their
credibility as scholars more than it should-but that is a judgment that they
should leave to their readers. Clients may also be expected to oppose such
disclosure, perhaps because their interests would be better served by having
their arguments presented as the views of a scholar rather than as positions
taken by a paid advocate. If the client is opposed to disclosure, a scholar would
still have the options of either turning down thejob or refraining from writing
as a scholar about the issues she analyzed for the client. Rather than arguing
against disclosure, the fact that disclosure runs counter to the interests of
consulting professors and their clients may mean that we need strong norms
about the importance of disclosure, perhaps backed up by institutional rules.
Beyond that, I think there is little to be done at the institutional level that
does not threaten to do more harm than good. We must therefore rely on the
good faith and judgment of individual faculty members to balance the professional value of their consulting activities against its distorting effects on their
scholarship. The most important thing is that faculty acknowledge the problem and take responsibility for managing it. The problem lies peculiarly
within our own minds. Skeptical self-awareness is our most important defense
against self-deception, and avoiding self-deception is critical if we are to avoid
deceiving our readers.

